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Every phenomenon exists in several dimensions. It has several ontological attributes, so to
speak, which provide opportunities for a variety of interpretations. The Bolshevik Revo-
lution and the Soviet regime could be an example. At the beginning of Soviet history the
revolution was seen as the beginning of a worldwide revolution opening an era of liber-
ation for workers all over the world. As the Soviet regime solidiﬁed its position, the hope
for worldwide revolution faded. In the new context, observers, especially outside Russia,
looked at the regime from a different perspective. For them it represented the country’s
national interests, and its socialist slogans should not be taken at face value. Some believed
post-revolutionary Russia was similar to post-revolutionary France and was experiencing
its “Thermidor.” Others assumed the revolution showed Russia as a “Eurasian” state where
all ethnic/religious groups lived in “symbiosis.” Finally, some assumed the Soviet regime
would lead to the transformation of the human species and the human conquest of
cosmos. This transition from one image to another does not mean that one illusion, one
“wrong” image, follows another. It also does not mean the very notion of true meaning is
meaningless simply because no reality exists as a ﬁxed entity, and one could therefore
“construct” any type of reality. It simply means that there are many attributes of the
revolution, which are revealed in the course of time.
Copyright  2013, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. The image of the Russian Revolution
Through most of the twentieth century, the Russian Rev-
olutionwas a living event, part of thepolitical and intellectual
life of the Soviet regime. But by 1991 the revolution had died
as an ongoing process. It received its ﬁnal coup de grâce on
November 7, 2005. For the entire Soviet era, November 7 hadarch Center, Hanyang
r
sia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Habeen an ofﬁcial holiday commemorating the Bolshevik Rev-
olution. In 2005, it was replaced by November 4, which
memorialized the defeat of the Poles at the beginning of the
seventeenth century. The Revolution had ﬁnally become
history––a historical image, a true artifact. We can now
approach the Russian Revolution from this vantage point.
It is beyond the scope of this essay, indeed, beyond the
scope of a long monograph, to examine how the image of
the Russian Revolution changed in Russian thought over a
few years. The modest goal here is to outline the major
changes in perceptions of the Revolution and of socialism in
Russian thought between the late nineteenth century and
the late 1920s, and to deal with some related subjects.
It is obvious that the image of the Russian Revolution
and socialismdlike that of any historical phenomen-
ondchanged in the course of political development. Thisnyang University. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1 More, Thomas; Adams, Robert Martin, Utopia: a New Translation,
Backgrounds, Criticism. New York: Norton, 1975.
2 Bernstein, Eduard, Evolutionary Socialism: A Criticism and Afﬁrmation,
New York: Schocken, 1961; Bernstein, Eduard, Ferdinand Lassalle as a
Social Reformer, New York: Greenwood Press, 1969.
3 Leont’ev, Konstantin, Against the Current; Selections from the Novels,
Essays, Notes, and Letters of Konstantin Leontiev. New York: Weybright and
Talley, 1969; Leont’ev, K., Vostok, Rossiia i slavianstvo: sbornik statei K.
Leont’eva, Osnabrück: O. Zeller, 1966.
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many. First, most mainstream social scientists and politi-
cians can hardly predict the future. This inability to un-
derstand the nature of coming events is not always
reducible to a problem intrinsic to the historical process, as
some postmodernists might argue. For them, history is
“text,” and the interconnection between events is arbitrary.
This makes prediction impossible. This assumption could
be partly true because it indicates the multiplicity of his-
torical options. However, the creativity of the historical
process alone does not explain why social scientists failed
to consider the possibility that socialism would rise and
then collapse. Well-established mainstream scientists/
politicians usually dominate visions of the past, present,
and future. Often, they fail to consider seriously the views
of those outside the establishment, e.g., academia or the
government, especially if those views differ markedly from
their own. Indeed, until the Russian Revolution, members
of the establishment viewed socialism mostly as a pipe
dream, an abstract theory with no chance of materializing.
The experiences of the Paris Commune had little impact on
their attitudes, despite fears of popular violence. Radical
Marxists, who believed socialism could be materialized,
were ignored or seen as eccentrics. Indeed, mainstream
social scientists and political pundits continued to ignore
thinkers who predicted the collapse of the USSR in the last
decade of the Soviet regime. There are other, less obvious
aspects of the study of the image of the Revolution.
Every historical phenomenon has a multitude, even
unlimited number of attributes, revealed over the historical
process. From the outset of their rule, Bolsheviks viewed
the revolution as the beginning of the worldwide liberation
of workers. This image survived until the end of the regime;
other features emerged along the way, revealing other at-
tributes of the regime. Some groupsdusually called Na-
tional Bolsheviksdsaw the Bolsheviks as a true national
power. Others saw them as opening a new era in the history
of the human speciesdhuman mastery over nature. It
would be incorrect to view these changes in the image as
shifts from one illusion to another, lapsing into absolute
relativism. Rather, they revealed the multiple attributes of
the historical phenomenon over time. Indeed, there are
many Bolshevik revolutions/Soviet regimes in the historical
contexts in which these phenomena are located; each of
the theoretically endless multitude of images could be
related to practice, events, or, implications of the Revolu-
tion and the regime that followed.
2. Socialist regime: the intellectual origin
Perceptions of the Soviet regime in the process of its
historical changes depend on the historical origin of the
image. This short history thus begins with the term’s ori-
gins. The word “socialism” has various meanings in
different political doctrines. Most envisaged it as a society
of social and political harmony. In the great religious
doctrines, such as Christianity, “socialism” also implies
solving the ultimate problemdthe resurrection of the
dead. This dream of the ideal society is as old as human
civilization. For most of history, socialism has been mostly
a cultural and philosophical abstraction. Many groups havetried to follow its dictums, to live in a society without
private property, but until the Bolshevik revolution no one
believed such a society could be constructed worldwide. It
is no accident that Utopia, the major work of Thomas More
(1478–1531, a founder of modern socialism), portrays
Utopia as impossible to create,1 or at least the distant is-
land suggested this. In the nineteenth century, even after
the Paris Commune, violent establishment of a society
without private property was not perceived as an imme-
diate threat by most of the West European elite. Revolu-
tion was not so much the creation of a new society as the
rule of the brutal mob––“gorillas,” as Hippolyte Taine
(1828–1893) put it. Even most social democratic parties in
the West regarded the victory of socialism as a distant,
semi-Utopian future. The motto of the West European
socialist movement was Eduard Bernstein’s (1850–1932)
famous slogan: “movement is everything, the goal is
nothing.”2
As a philosophy, socialism differed little from More’s
Utopia. It was a political abstraction related to, or more
precisely, unrelated to real political life, like “Liberté, éga-
lité, fraternité,” on the façade of French government
buildings. For most European socialists of the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, even for those
claiming to be Marxists, socialism was not real politics.
The Russian elite generally held the same view. Russian
authorities had experienced a wave of revolutionary terror
since 1866 and during the ﬁrst Russian Revolution in
1905–1906. Yet socialism was not what they feared most.
Acts of violence per se concerned authorities above all,
since they endangered the lives of the elite and threatened
the collapse of tsardom. In terms of a system that could
replace tsardom, violence might prolong or abort anarchy
and lead to complete restoration, possibly a constitutional
monarchy or the Western-style capitalist democracies
members of the imperial elite had witnessed. A prophetic
vision emerged of a near-term socialist society, including
plans for how it would materialize. Konstantine Leont’ev
(1831–1891), a conservative intellectual, envisaged the
coming of a socialist society; in his view, a tough disci-
plinarian regime, not social harmony, would result. In fact,
his vision of the future would later be called “totali-
tarian.”3 Although he was truly a prophetic visionary, the
conservative elite hardly understood or took note of his
work.3. Changes in the image: from political abstraction to
a plan of action
Most members of the elite in the West and Russia did
not believe in the creation of a socialist society, and yet a
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a society. For More, socialism was “Utopian” and could not
be materialized in real life. By the nineteenth century, Eu-
ropean and later Russian intellectuals adopted it as a po-
litical program. For Marx, the most inﬂuential, socialist
society would emerge from a violent uprising of the
worldwide proletariat. A society based on workers’ control
over the “means of production” and grassroots rule of the
workersda “dictatorship of the proletariat”dwould result.
In 1903, a party split gave rise to the Bolsheviks and Men-
sheviks, Russian followers of Marx who generally shared
the same vision of future society. The Mensheviks believed
Russia was too backward to engage in socialist revolution
and assumed it should experience a bourgeois revolution
ﬁrst.4 The Bolsheviks thought the bourgeoisie was too
closely connected with the autocracy to become engaged in
revolutionary struggle; instead, the proletariat would
launch the bourgeois revolution. In so doing, the proletariat
would ﬁrst destroy tsardom and, in alliance with poor
peasants, the capitalist order itself. Mensheviks pointed out
that this experiment would fail because if the proletariat
emerged victorious, the petty bourgeois peasantry would
still surround it. That would doom the socialist revolution
to failure. Bolsheviks responded that a proletarian revolu-
tion in Russia would trigger worldwide socialist revolu-
tions. The victoriousWest European proletariat would offer
a helping hand to its Russian brothers. Leon Trotsky and
Alexander Parvus (1867–1924) elaborated on this theory of
“permanent revolution.”5
Menshevik and Bolshevik views on the ways a socialist
regime should be established in Russia differed, but their
views on a future socialist society were identical: a grass-
roots democracy of the workers, who controlled the means
of production. Ethnic minorities should have the right of
self-determination, even if this meant the disintegration of
the Russian empire. They believed this disintegration had
no meaning, and downplayed its signiﬁcance for several
reasons. First, nationalism was a bourgeois ideology that
prevented workers from acquiring a “proletarian con-
science,” to become a class of their own and forge ahead
with worldwide revolution. Second, if the “proletariat had
no motherland” and the “proletariat of all countries must
unite,” after the collapse of the capitalist order, workers
from all ethnic groups would unite in a free confederation
that would cleanse itself of bourgeois nationalism. In a
socialist order, with the free association of self-governing
worker bodies and freedom from the state as an institu-
tion outside society, nationalismwould play aminimal role.
This vision of a future socialist society is clearly stated in
Lenin’s State and Revolution.6 One could question Lenin’s4 For a general account of the Menshevik position, see Haimson,
Leopold H.; Dallin, David J., The Mensheviks: From the Revolution of 1917
to the Second World War, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974;
Ascher, Abraham, The Mensheviks in the Russian Revolution, Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1976.
5 Parvus; Lehmann, Karl, Rossiia i revoliutsiia, St. Petersburg: Izdanie N.
Glagoleva, 1907; Trotsky, Leon, The Permanent Revolution, and Results and
Prospects, New York: Merit Publishers, 1969.
6 Lenin, Vladimir Il’ich, State and Revolution, New York: International
Publishers, 1932.assumption that socialism would be a stateless, harmo-
nious grassroots democracy of workers. The many histo-
rians who challenge his characterization usually emphasize
that he and other Bolsheviks entertained totalitarian pro-
clivities early on. They point to his pet idea of a party, a
highly centralized bureaucratic machine that was an em-
bryonic totalitarian state. These historians also observe
Lenin’s admiration for the use of terror, for instance, the
French Revolution.7
These statements require clariﬁcation. Lenin did regard
a highly centralized party as the only way to lead the pro-
letariat to socialist revolution. He believed that without
party leadership the workers would only ﬁght for
improving their condition in the capitalist system. But he
never envisaged a party as an institution that would place
itself over the proletariat. Lenin’s positive statements about
terror, including the French Revolution, were made in the
context of the leftist historians of the revolution. Terror was
the weapon of the masses, by which they smashed the
ancient, pre-revolutionary regime. Lenin never praised
terror against the masses. Moreover, in the body of his
work, terror occupied a marginal place. The mistakes of
those who thought the Bolsheviks had planned to create
the totalitarian regime long before taking power are
manifold. First, these historians tried to ﬁnd continuity in
Bolshevism and to place the pre-revolutionary and revo-
lutionary Lenin in the same ideological “discourse.” In their
view, Marxism or any socialist ideology has a clear terrorist
message, and the proponents of this ideology were aware
of this from the beginning.8 The sameness/continuity of the
ideological and political paradigms shows the danger of the
ideology of the Left with whom these conservativeWestern
historians had been engaged in polemics throughout their
academic careers.9
The second, more serious problem is that these histo-
rians confused two opposite aspects of the Bolsheviks’ ac-
tivities, and not only Bolsheviks; they confused the self-
image/political program with real political implications.
In some casesdthe Nazis, for exampledthe ideological
paradigms and real political implications were the same.
For Lenin and many other Bolsheviks, however, the pro-
grams often had nothing in commonwith political realities.
This later led to the emergence of Bolsheviks who were
disappointed by the results of their victories. There were no
disappointed Nazis. Or, to be precise, Nazis could be
disappointed by defeatdby the fact that the “Thousand-
Year Reich” was much shorterdbut not by the actual re-
sults of the Nazi regime.
Lenin and his fellow Bolsheviks generally envisaged
socialism as a society of social harmony because the7 Pipes, Richard, The Russian Revolution, New York: Knopf, 1990;
Service, Robert, A History of Twentieth-Century Russia, Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1998; Parry, Albert, Terrorism: From Robespierre
to Arafat, New York: Vanguard Press, 1976.
8 Courtois, Stephanie; Kramer, Mark; The Black Book of Communism:
Crimes, Terror, Repression, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1999.
9 Malia, Martin E., The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia,
1917–1991, New York: Free Press; Toronto: Maxwell Macmillan Canada;
New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1994.
11 On the analysis of the various interpretations of the Bolshevik Rev-
olution, see: Billington, James H., “Six Views of the Russian Revolution,”
World Politics, 1966 18 (3), pp. 452–473.
12 Kuczynski, J}urgen, “Die Allgemeiine Krise des Kapitalismus und die
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ersdworkers and poor peasants. The major point of this
society was the end of exploitation and suffering of the
populace. This image of a self-controlled, self-organized
socialist society had two apparent sources. First was
populist tradition that regarded the future socialist society,
at least in Russia, as similar to the Russian peasant
commune, idealized, of course. Second was Marxist tradi-
tion: Marx, when he envisaged the socialist society, had
looked at the Paris Commune, itself based on tradition back
to self-governing urban communities of the late Middle
Ages.
4. The February Revolution
While it seems that all Russian oppositionists, regard-
less of political persuasion, had worked for the end of the
regime, the actual collapse of tsardom was a great surprise
for the vast majority. In fact, Lenin wrote on the eve of the
February Revolution that he, the representative of the older
generation, would not live long enough to see the new
revolutionary wave.
The collapse of the tsarist regime did not lead to
increased fear of socialism in Russia. For the vast majority
of conservative and liberal intellectuals, even liberal so-
cialists such as Mensheviks, socialism, especially in Russia,
was a pipe dream. For most Russian Leftist parties, a
democratic capitalist society was Russia’s future, and, of
course, victory in the war was the immediate task. Lenin
and a few of his followers were of course exceptions. The
Provisional Government did not take their plans seriously,
a major reason they were able to go back to Russia. At the
beginning of the post-tsarist era, both the political/intel-
lectual elite and the masses had been in a state of exal-
tation and believed that all problems of society would be
solved just because autocracy had been replaced by the
Provisional Government.10 This belief that all parties
would be united for a common causedthe defeat of Ger-
manydand that all plans for violent, if needed, socialist
transformation of the society could be safely ignored, as in
More’s Utopia, led to permission for Lenin and other Bol-
sheviks to return to Russia. Even Lenin’s April Theses,
which clearly outlined the Bolshevik plan for a new so-
cialist revolution, did not alarm the Provisional Govern-
ment. Lenin was not only not feared but barely taken into
account by Russian or Western observers or public. His
marginality could be seen by the following fact. The
erudite London Times had provided a detailed description
of life in Russia, including a description of major crimes.
But it did not mention Lenin at all until his own rise to
power in 1917, and then only rather brieﬂy.
As time progressed, the original excitement of the
February Revolution disappeared, and fear of political
instability increased among all political segments of10 For a general account of the February/March Revolution, see Katkov,
George, Russia, 1917: The February Revolution, New York: Harper & Row,
1967. Richard, Abraham, Alexander Kerensky: The ﬁrst Love of the Revolu-
tion, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987. Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi, The
February Revolution, Petrograd, 1917, Seattle: University of Washington
Press, 1981.Russian society, from Mensheviks to conservative politi-
cians and intellectuals. Bolsheviks emerged more and
more as a people of concern. But even then they were
hardly seen as a threat because of their plans to create a
socialist society, still a pipe dream. Rather, they were seen
as a threat because they were associated by the majority
with instability. The problem was not so much what could
be called class struggle but anarchy, in which, to outside
observers, Bolsheviks played a crucial role. They were seen
not as symbols of the totalitarian state but as symbols,
even agents, of anarchy. They were also seen as hirelings
of the Germans, unprincipled adventurers bought by the
Germans and ready to transform Russia into a German
colony.
The Bolsheviks had a different idea. They ﬂatly rejec-
ted the notion that the situation in the country was
anarchy, directed against any state regardless of political
color. They saw around them nothing but the manifes-
tation of class struggle, the attacks of Russian workers
and peasants against the capitalists, the landlords and
the government behind them. While increasing numbers
of their enemies demanded a strong dictatorship as the
only way to stop anarchy, Bolsheviks proclaimed that
giving the power to the people would solve all the
problems of society.
5. Bolshevik victory
In October/November 1917, the Bolsheviks took power,
and this event certainly inﬂuenced their perception of
themselves and that of the other players. It is appropriate
here to provide a short sketch as to what degree the Bol-
sheviks’ victory was inevitable11 and the nature of the
regime. This will help account for the changes in images of
the regime in the future.
During the Soviet regime not only Soviet and East Eu-
ropean satellite historians,12 but quite a few Westerners
tended to emphasize the inevitability of the Bolshevik
victory, and often related it with the country’s political
culture deeply imbedded in historical tradition.13 Those on
the political left usually saw the revolution as the masses’
inevitable quest for justice. It was proclaimed as just the
beginning of the worldwide process of the liberation of the
oppressed. Those on the right in Western, especially
American academia, saw Bolshevism, together with
fascism, Nazism, and similar political trends, as a sign that
political liberty, Western democratic capitalism, was on its
deathbed and totalitarian regimes would most likely engulf
humanity. Western liberalism was a ﬂeeting phenomenon,Oktoberrevolution,” Jahrbuch f}ur Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 1977 (3), pp. 43–
46. Ganelin, Rafail Sholomovich, “Tvorcheskii put’ A. Ia. Avrekha,” Istoriia
SSSR 1990 (4) pp. 102–112. Hagen, Manfred, “Erweiterung des Gebäudes’?
Sowjetische Historiker }Uber die Epoche, 1895–1917, ” Jahrb}ucher f}ur
Geschichte Osteuropas, 1987 35 (3), pp. 390–404.
13 See for example: Gemet, Kristian, “The Bolshevik Order and Russian
Tradition,” Nordic Journal of Soviet and East European Studies, 1986, 3 (1),
pp. 21–44.
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when they saw such a strong anti-Communist leader as
Ronald Reagan, they were not at all sure the West would
prevail.
The collapse of the Soviet regime and the USSR led to
the reevaluation of Bolshevism as a political trend. If pre-
viously stress was on the inevitability of Bolshevism,
impersonal aspects of the movement, and the strength of
the Soviet system, the new trend in historiography has a
different interpretation of events. The stress is on the
accidental nature of the movement, how easily the Bol-
sheviks could have been defeated and replaced by other
regimes, or how the historical process had led inevitably to
their downfall.14
How should one approach such theories that seem to
exclude each other? To understand the nature of the
Bolshevik movement and the regime it created, it is useful
to place “Bolshevism” into several layers or aspects. It is
clear that the Bolshevik victory as a movement was not
predestined, and the fact that Bolsheviks had been
marginalized, even ignored by a broad segment of the
Russian political elite was not accidental. It was not due to
inability to see the Bolsheviks as the only people who truly
understood the historical process. Bolsheviks were quite a
small group, and even by fall 1917 when their inﬂuence had
increased, they could have been easily destroyed or
marginalized by the historical process. It was not accidental
that Lenin, with his deep understanding of the ease with
this could happen, wrote to his comrades that they should
strike in this very propitious moment. “Delay in starting of
the uprising is tantamount to death,” he stated bluntly. One
might say that the Bolshevik victory was the less viable
option for Russia after the end of the tsarist regime, or at
least not among the most likely scenarios.
The most likely scenario would have been the disinte-
gration of the Russian empire, with some parts being
incorporated in the colonial empires of the victorious
powers in WW I, somewhat like the Ottoman Empire.15
Russia’s fate might have been similar to that of the Aus-
trian–Hungarian empire and, of course, the USSR in the
future. It was also quite unlikely that Western capitalist
democracy would survive in this truncated Russian state,
and right-wing dictatorship wouldmost be likely in charge.
This regimewouldmostly remainwhat one could see in the
territories occupied by the Whites.
While the Bolsheviks’ victory and especially their suc-
cess in the Civil War were hardly predestined, it would be
equally wrong to see them and their future activities as
absolutely unrelated to life in Russia, something imposed
on helpless society because of the artiﬁcial Marxist para-
digm. In fact, the Bolsheviks had done something quite
similar to their enemies.14 Golubev, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, “Rossiia, Vek XX,” Otechestvennaia
Istoriia, 1997 (5): 80–92.
15 Russia’s fate could well have been similar to that of the Ottoman
Empire. See: Marian, Kent, Ed., The Great Powers and the End of the
Ottoman Empire, Winchester, Mass.: Allen & Unwin, 1984. McCarthy,
Justin, The Ottoman Peoples and the End of Empire, London: Arnold, 2001.
Macﬁe, A. L., The End of the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1923, White Plains, NY:
Longman, 1998.Aleksandr Kolchak (1874–1920), Anton Denikin (1872–
1947), and Peter Wrangel (1878–1928) were among those
who might have run Russia if Bolshevism had been defea-
ted. Certainly they would not be carbon copies of the Bol-
sheviks; they would, at least in words, assert the
importance of private property as an institution. Still,
structurally, they would have had much in common with
the Bolsheviks. They would employ terror, albeit with less
ferocity. Quite a few had engaged in conﬁscation of food-
stuffs and regulating the economy during the Civil War and
most likely would shun laissez faire, at least in its pure
form, in case of victory.
6. Bolshevik Revolution and Civil War
When the Bolsheviks came to power, they found soci-
ety in a crisis that had started long before and ﬁnally led to
institutionalization of the reign of terror. While ofﬁcially
the Red Terror was launched against the enemies of the
regimedpolitical parties, particular social groups, and
common criminalsdit had much broader implications. It
sped up the general bureaucratic ossiﬁcation of society
and increased the regulating/controlling aspect of the
state in all of life. This led the Bolsheviks to reevaluate
their vision of themselves. Despite the obvious differences
between the claimed democratic nature of the Soviet state
and the realities of the terror, Lenin continued to proclaim
that the regime was democratic and represented the will
of the majority of the toilers. As to repression of the
masses, in any revolution, some of those who had
beneﬁted could be misled and act against the power that
actually represented them. In this situation the regime had
no option but to strike even against groups that could
beneﬁt from its policy.
While Lenin and other Bolsheviks tried to connect the
practice of the regime and original postulates of the system,
that the regime was democratic, they were increasingly
unable to do so. Indeed, as time progressed, the ossiﬁcation
of the regime and the political slogans became more and
more contradictory, and, at that point, possibly already in
Civil War times, the Orwellian bureauﬁcation of Bolshevik
ideology took place. Actually, two ideologies emerged. One
was the ofﬁcial ideology, the self-image of the regime that
had been publicly displayed until the very end. This image
maintained that the Soviet regime was fully democratic; it
was not only the rule of the people, but much more
advanced than Western capitalist democracy. This self-
image had been needed for the regime to legitimize itself
through and by the Marxist paradigm. And through this
image, the regime connected itself, at least from the ideo-
logical view, with the democratic traditions of the eigh-
teenth century.
The other ideology could be called “functional.” It was
the ideology that reﬂected the real essence of the regi-
medthe increasing emphasis on the power of the elite and,
by the end of the Civil War, on the increasing power of the
state. These two ideologies, Marxist and “functional,” had
not always been in conﬂict. During the ﬁrst years of the
regime, for example, ofﬁcial ideology promulgated that
facilitating worldwide revolution was one of the regime’s
major goals. But this proclamationwas increasingly became
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Marxist paradigms and imperial raison d’état nicely com-
plemented each other.7. The birth of National Bolshevism
Thus, despite the increasing terror and ossiﬁcation of
the regime, the Soviet authorities continued to proclaim
until the very end that they represented the majority of the
common folk. Terror was mostly directed against political
parties hostile to the regime and “exploiters,” i.e., capital-
ists and landlords. And, of course, the sword of the state
had smitten the agents of foreign powers. Thus, the Soviet
regime was not born of the bones of the people but rep-
resented the broadest segments of the toiling masses.
The enemies of the Bolsheviks saw the regime differ-
ently. All parties were surprised by their victory and even
more so by their tenacity in keeping power. They believed
the Bolsheviks would not survive for long, and regarded
them as a minority that had imposed its power over the
majority. The different political parties also had different
views as to who these minorities were. For monarchists,
Bolsheviks were the representatives of the minorities,
mostly Jews, who took power to beneﬁt themselves.16 For
liberals, Bolsheviks were radical fanatics whose goal was
to change Russia according to unworkable political the-
ories, and who engaged in this policy regardless of the
suffering of the people and economic collapse of the state.
Mensheviks assumed socialism could not be built up at
that time in backward Russia. They were in solidarity with
liberals who regarded Bolsheviks as Utopians who ruined
the country. They also believed Bolshevik policy would
lead to collapse and a counter-revolutionary bourgeois
regime.17
Thus, for all these groups, the crime of the Bolsheviks
was that they had emerged as a power that had placed
itself above the people, either the entire Russian peo-
pledthis was the case with monarchists and liberalsdor
the proletariat. Still, the dictatorial nature of Bolshevism
was actually not a curse but a blessing: their legitimiza-
tion. Indeed, some of the Bolsheviks’ enemies noted early
on that the Bolsheviks’ absolute power and broad appli-
cation of terror could “normalize” Russian society by
stopping the increasing anarchy and disintegration of the
state.
The spreading anarchy and disintegration of the
Russian state was a great blow to patriotic members of the
Russian elite. Quite a few monarchists and conservative
liberals proclaimed that the Bolsheviks were responsible
for all these calamities. Their destructive propaganda had
transformed the God-fearing, tsar-loving Russians who16 Jews had indeed played a considerable role in the Russian revolution.
See Schapiro, Leonard, “Role of the Jews in the Russian Revolutionary
Movement,” Slavonic and East European Review, 1961 40 (94), pp. 148–167.
Shevyrin, Viktor, et al.; Weinberg, Robert, Editors; Budnitski Oleg, Introd.;
“From the History and Mythology of the Revolution: Why the Jews?, A
Roundtable Discussion”, Russian Studies in History, 2004 43 (2), pp. 3–76.
17 On the Menshiviks’ attitude in the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revo-
lution: Liebich, Andr _e Liebich, From the Other Shore: Russian Social De-
mocracy after 1921, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997.had created one of the greatest global empires into a mob
that had destroyed the state. Still, a considerable number
of the Bolsheviks’ original enemies, including numbers of
ofﬁcers of the old army, among others, started to see the
populace as senseless brutes, vicious animals who did not
care about the state and whose major occupation was
looting, murder, rape, and drunken orgies. In this theory,
Bolsheviks should not be blamed for the destruction; they
simply followed the populace’s brutal instincts. When the
Bolsheviks started the terror in which the populace suf-
fered, these intellectuals had no compassion for the
masses and even started grudgingly to accept Bolshevik
methods.
One such intellectual, Iurii Got’e, wrote in his diary that
he saw the people hardly as noble citizens who took the
problems of the motherland close to the heart, but as
“gorillas”dthe term most likely from Taine.18 This sort of
criminal could only engage in excesses, so Got’e had no
compassion for the populace who suffered under the iron
rule of the Bolsheviks. While “gorillas”dthe massesdwere
disgusting for Got’e, the Bolsheviks were, of course, not
much better; and he did not believe they would be able to
restore the order and stability of society. Actually, he saw no
force that could save Russia: it was doomed to be a colony of
the Germans. As a Russian patriot, Got’e made this confes-
sion to himself with a broken heart. But he did not see a force
that could save the country, and he preferred Germany to the
outrages of the populace and Bolsheviks. In fact, for Got’e
there was not much difference between the two.
Other members of the Russian anti-Bolshevik elite saw
the Bolsheviks and the populace as different forces, and the
fact that the Bolsheviks had placed themselves above the
populace was generally praised based on several assump-
tions. First, they believed that by launching terror, the
Bolsheviks had brought some modicum of stability into
society, slowing down the wave of anarchy. Second, and
most important, they saw in Bolshevik repression an
essential way of installing discipline in the Red Army,
which they regarded as the Russian national army. In their
view, the Red Army had done much more to recreate the
Russian state than had the Whites. This view began to be
espoused by numerous ofﬁcers of the old army, who started
to serve the Red, and even by members of the political/
military elite who did not join the Bolsheviks.
Nikolai Ustrialov (1890–1937), one of the future
founders of “National Bolshevism,” started to appreciate
the Bolsheviks’ political virility while he was still serving
under Admiral Kolchak, the White ruler of Siberia and
major pretender to replace the Bolsheviks. Such views
also seem to have spread among the rank and ﬁle of the
White ofﬁcers who watched the powerlessness of the
White forces and the policy of the foreign powers who,
under the pretext of ﬁghting Bolsheviks, wanted to
weaken Russia as a state. In one episode, remembered
later by a participant, two White ofﬁcers who lived un-
derground met at Red Square in Moscow, where they
watched the parade of Red troops. One told the other that18 Got’e, Iu V, Time of Troubles: The Diary of Iurii Vladimirovich Got’e: Mos-
cow, July 8, 1917 to July 23, 1922, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.
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did not understand because he saw not White but Red
troops. Still, his friend insisted the White had won. He
pointed out that the very nature of the White cause was
the creation of a powerfully disciplined army and pre-
serving Russia “united and indivisible.” And precisely this
had been achieved by the Red.1920 This vision of the Soviet regime as having “betrayed” the goals of the
Bolshevik Revolution and become the oppressive regime that lorded over
the masses became quite popular. It was quite popular among the
Western Left and survived to the present. Raskolnikov, Fedor, “Lettre
ouverte a Staline,” Contrat Social, 1965 9 (5), 313–320, Gilmozzi, M.,
“L’Eredita di Trotzky alle radicidel conﬂitto Cino-Sovietico,” Civitas 1964,
15 (4–5), pp. 11–23.
21 For the best account of Struve’s life and thinking in Revolutionary
Russia, ses, Pipes, Richard, Struve: Liberal on the Rright, 1905–1944, Cam-8. NEP transformation and the image of imminent
restoration
During the Bolshevik Revolution and Civil War, most of
the enemies of the regime believed it would be destroyed
as a result of a sudden breakdown, such as defeat on the
front or an uprising the Bolsheviks could not to put down.
The regimewas often seen as extremely fragile and ready to
collapse at any moment. Quite a few Bolsheviks themselves
held this view and were convinced that unless they were
supported by the European proletariat engaged in world-
wide revolution, they would hardly survive. Their ambition
was thus to make a mark on global history and send an
inspiring message to future generations, as had been done
by the Paris Commune and the French Revolution.
By 1921, with the Civil War at an end and the Bolsheviks
unexpectedly surviving despite all odds, without the
backing of worldwide revolution, the image of the regime
and its possible demise started to change. The new
approach did not exclude the scenario of the regime’s
abrupt end. The regime, in the views of some observers,
could collapse as a result of war; the victory in the Civil War
was just luck and theywould not survive an encounterwith
the much stronger West. An open counter-revolutionary
coup was also regarded as a possibility. Both scenarios
were regarded seriously by Bolsheviks and their enemies
alike. While these scenarios from the old revolutionary era
were still circulating, they were increasingly replaced by
another scenario of the regime’s collapse and the regime as
such. This new vision of the regime implied that it was not
as fragile as thought. And while being knocked down by
openly counter-revolutionary forces were not excluded, the
end of the regime most likely would come by internal
evolution.
The belief that the regime had the seeds of destruction
in itself was substantiated by a new economic policy that
slackened government control over economic life. While
various historical/political/social paradigms were
employed to describe NEP Russia, the analogy with Ther-
midorian France was seen as the most appropriate. Trotsky
was among those who employed such an analogy with
much enthusiasm.
By the early 1920s, when Lenin became ill, and especially
after his death in 1924, Trotsky was more and more pushed
aside by the triumvirate of Joseph Stalin (1878–1953), Gri-
gory Zinov’ev (1883–1936), and Lev Kamenev (1883–1936).
It started to seemmore andmore, as themajority of émigrés
proclaimed, that the party was in the process of bureaucratic19 For an account of the episode, see: Shlapentokh, Dmitry, “Can Russia
Rise Again?” in Democracy, edited by Frankel Paul, Ellen; Miller, Fred D.,
Jr., and Paul, Jeffrey, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.degeneration or had already done so. In this theory, the party
became alienated from the masses, and the bureaucracy
lorded over the rank and ﬁle. The development of the NEP,
which provided room for small business and corrupted bu-
reaucracy, provided Trotsky and his followers with addi-
tional arguments to see the regime as actually foreign to the
masses. In Trotsky’s view, the Soviet regime was approach-
ing or already lapsed into “Thermidor.”
The Thermidor modeldat least in the Trotskyist view-
dgave a bleak vision of the Soviet regime. According to this
model, the regime was ended or about to be so as the
regime of the workers and poor peasants: “revolution was
betrayed.”20 This view of the Soviet regime as absolutely
foreign to the Russian populace, repressive and destructive
for the economy and society, continued to be popular
among most émigrés. Mensheviks were eager to accept
Trotskyists’ description of the regime and accept their ideas
that it was moving to the end, through slow evolution or
violently. Mensheviks, however, still assumed that social-
ism was a viable ideology and the Soviet regime had some
positive aspects. Conservative liberals like Petr B. Struve
(1870–1944) and other conservative liberals had speciﬁc
views of the Soviet regime and its end. For them, socialism
was a dangerous Utopia and Bolsheviks who served their
own ideology had no connection with Russia.21 Therefore,
Struve offered the regime no hope for evolution and a slow
move to “Thermidor.” In his view, the regime could not
evolve but should collapse, and like the Mensheviks he
believed this collapse was at hand.
Monarchists were equally convinced that the Bolshevik
regime was absolutely foreign to the people; the only dif-
ference from Struve’s approach was their belief that Men-
sheviks and even liberals were responsible for Russia’s
present-day suffering. The monarchists also believed that
the Bolsheviks were not so much Utopian visionaries or
corrupted power-hungry outcasts as Jews and other mi-
norities. The Soviet rule was not so much the power of
Utopians who wanted to spread their ideas all over the
world, or of unprincipled institutional criminals who
wanted power and the beneﬁts of power, but of Jews who
had taken power to beneﬁt their kin. Removing the Bol-
sheviks would not necessarily beneﬁt Russia, for power
could be taken by worldwide Jewry or by Russians who
directly or indirectly followed their bidding. Only a legiti-
mate monarchy would save Russia. And monarchist groups
scattered all over the world looked for an appropriate and
legitimate pretender to the throne.bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980. See also: Utechin, S.V.,
“Struve,” Russian Review, 1981 40 (2), pp. 158–162. Plotnikov, Nikolai,
Swiderski, E.M., translators, “Revolution and the Counter-Revolution:
The Conﬂict Over Meaning Between P.B. Struve and S. L. Frank in 1922,”
Studies in East European Thought, 1994 46 (3), pp. 187–196.
23 Oberländer, Erwin, “National-Bolschewistische Tendenzen in der
Russischen Intelligenz,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, 1968, 16 (2),
pp. 194–211. Agursky, Mikhail, “Defeat as Victory and the Living Death:
The Case of Ustrialov,” History of European Ideas, 1984 5 (2), pp. 165–180.
Tamas, Krausz, “A Nacional-Bolsevizmus alapvetése: TTrténeti adalékok
egy rendszerváltás ideológiai hátteréhez,” Multunk, 1994 39 (1–2), pp.
51–80. Onegina, Svetlana Viktorovna, “Porevoliutsionnye politcheskie
dvizheniia Rossiiskoi emigratsii v 20-30-E Gody: k istorii ideologii,”
Otechestvennaia Istoriia, 1998 (4), pp. 87–99. Romanovski, Viacheslav
Konstantinovich, “Nikolai Vasil’evich Ustrialov,” Otechestvennaia Istoriia,
2002 (4), pp. 79–99. Bystriantseva, Liudmila Anatol’evna, “Mirovozzrenie
i obshchestvenno-politicheskaia deiatel’nost’ N. V. Ustrialova (1889–
1937),” Novaia Noveishaia i Istoriia, 2000 (5), pp. 162–190.
24 Despite the fact that Eurasianism had fascinated quite a few European
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regime
Thus, by the 1920s, the majority of émigrés regarded the
Bolsheviks as a power foreign to Russia, who not only
oppressed the Russian people but brutally destroyed the
state and economy. By the late 1920s, Trotskyists had joined
in vilifying the regime. Mainstream Bolsheviks continued
to regard the regime as totally democratic. Thus, the ofﬁcial
ideology of the regime continued to emphasize concern
with the worldwide proletariat and “worldwide revolu-
tion,” and emphasized that the capitalist world had just
entered a period of “temporal stabilization.” At the same
time, the political reality of the regime increasingly implied
that the Bolsheviks were becoming concerned with
strengthening the Russian state. Consequently, nationalism
became more visible in ofﬁcial, or at least semiofﬁcial
discourse.
While nationalism became increasingly accepted in
Soviet ofﬁcial discourse by the 1920s, socialism was
emphasized, and statism as ideology was downplayed by
ofﬁcial ideologists. Nationalism was a sort of subconscious
libido of these ideologists and was handled with caution, at
least in the 1920s. It was National Bolsheviks who elabo-
rated this hidden but real ideology.
The National Bolsheviks had emerged from members of
the non-Bolshevik elite who had already engaged in Civil
War and saw in the Bolsheviks a force that reuniﬁed the
state and brought a modicum of order. They also believed
that the deeds of the Bolsheviksdquite nationalistic, im-
perial by implicationdwere much more important than
their ofﬁcial ideological proclamations. Socialism and
nationalism were not sworn enemies as seen before, but
complementary. The idea that socialism and nationalism
could easily be blended was deﬁnitely not just a product of
Bolshevik Russia. National Bolshevism could be found in
other countries in the post-World War I era and was not
necessarily connected with racism, as German National
Socialism would be in the future.22
The National Bolsheviks of the 1920s were direct or
indirect heirs of these earlier variations of the National
Bolshevism of the Civil War period. They were stimulated
in their views of Soviet Russia not just by developments in
the USSR, but also in their personal experience. The feeling
that the Allies had betrayed the Whites and the misery of
emigrant life pushed them to be skeptical in regard to
Western capitalist democracies. They also felt that monar-
chists and even liberals lacked workable plans: they not
only could not prevent the revolution, but did not, or at
least did not want to understand, that pre-revolutionary22 National Bolshevism, for example, was well known in Germany, with
Ernst Niekisch. See: Buchheim, Hans, “Ernst Niekischs Ideologie des
Widerstands,” Vierteljahrshefte f}ur Zeitgeschichte 1957 5 (4), pp. 334–361.
Dupeux, Louis, “Pseudo-‘travailleur’ contre prétendu ‘état bourgrois’:
l’interpretation de l’hitlerisme par Ernst Niekisch en 1934–35,” Revue
d’Allemagne, 1984 16 (3), pp. 434–449. Pittwald, Michael, “Zur Entwick-
lung Völkischen Denkens in der Duetschen Arbeiterbewegung der Na-
tional Revolutionär Ernst Niekisch,” Internatonale Wissenschaftliche
Korrespondenz zur Geschichte der Deutschen, Arbeiterbewegung, 1996 32
(1), pp. 3–22.Russia was gone and every new regime would need to
take Soviet realities into account. The National Bolsheviks
usually called themselves “post-revolutionaries” who
would take into account the Soviet experience.
National Bolsheviks shared an ideological core, praising
the Bolsheviks for resurrecting the Russian state and reas-
serting Russian nationalism, often in messianic form. Still,
there was a substantial difference dividing them into two
groups. The ﬁrst group believed that Russia was a Western
country and that the Western experience was in general
universally applicable. The other group believed that Russia
had its own way of development; Russia could and should
interact with theWest, not as a pupil or even partner, but as
a leader.
Ustrialov was possibly one of the best-known National
Bolsheviks of the Westernized variation.23 Ustrialov had
started to develop his National Bolshevik ideas during the
Civil War, and they took full shape afterward. By that time,
he had concluded that with all the calamities, the revolu-
tion had been, in general, a positive phenomenon. Revo-
lution had replaced the weak elite by the strong and had
created a stronger Russian state. At the same time, Ustria-
lov, at least in the 1920s, could not accept Bolshevism in its
totality, especially the policy of total state control over
economic development. Also at this time, Ustrialov sup-
ported NEP and believed it should go much farther in
economic liberation. Private property, including over land,
should be ﬁnally institutionalized. Similar ideas were
shared by the groups of émigré intellectuals known as the
“Change Landmark” movement, with which Ustrialov was
afﬁliated. All of them saw Bolsheviks as an essential force
that would lead to a strong, European-style authoritarian
state.
Much more interesting were the émigrés who regarded
Russia as absolutely different from the West, the Eura-
sianists in particular.24 The importance of Eurasianism isintellectuals shortly after its birth and its original interest among the
émigré community later, upon the decline of the movement, Western
scholars had lost interest in the movement; and the publications on
Eurasiasm were few. Only a handful of articles, for example, had been
published for almost 20 years, from the 1960s to the middle of the 1980s,
e.g., the time of Gorbachev’s “perestroika.” For examples of these early
publications, see: Riasanovsky, Nicholas V., “Prince N. S. Trubetskoy’s
‘Europe and Mankind’,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, 1964, 12 (2),
pp. 207–220. Nivat, Georges, “Du ‘Panmongolisme’ au mouvement eur-
asien,” Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique (France) 1966 7 (3), pp 460–
478. Luks, Leonid, “Die Ideologie der Eurasier im zeitgeschichtlichen
Zusammenhang,” West Germany: Jahbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas,
1986 34 (3), pp. 374–395.
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that survived to the post-Soviet period. Moreover, it
continued to play an important role in post-Soviet cultural/
political life. It became popular in Yeltsin’s era.25 Interest in
historical or “classical” Eurasianism remains in the
present.2625 It was this renewed popularity of Eurasianism among the Russian
public that had led to publications on Eurasianism among Western and
Russian scholars. See, for example: Gorizontov, Leonid Efremovich,
“Evraziistvo, 1921–1931 GG: vzgliad iznutri,” Slavianovedenie, 1992 (4),
pp. 86–104. Robinson, Mikhail Andreevich and Petrovski, Leonid
Petrovich, “N. N. Durnovo in. s. Trubetskoi: problema Evraziistva v kon-
tekste ‘dela Slavistov,’ materialam OGPU-NKVD.” Slavianovedenie, 1992
(4), pp. 68–82. Robinson, M. A. “Pis’mo P.N. Savitskogo F. I. Uspenskomu,”
Slavianovedenie. 1992 (4), pp. 83–85. D’iakov, Vladimir Anatol’evich, “O
nauchom soderzhanii i politcheskikh interpretatsiiakh istoriosoﬁi Evra-
ziistva,” Slavianovedenie, 1993 (5), pp. 101-Revue des Etudes Slaves, 1994,
66 (1), 73–86. Perkhin, V. V. “Literaturnye Spory M. Gor’kogo (1935–36);
k. kharakteristike kritcheskogo metoda,” Vestnik Sankt Peterburgskogo
Universiteta, Seriia 2, Istoriia, Iazykoznanie, Literaturovedenie, 1993 (4), pp.
50–57. Kaznina, Ol’ga Anatol’evna, “N. S. Trubetskoi i krizis Evraziistva,”
Slavianovedenie, 1995 (4), pp. 89–95. Hauchard, Claire, “L. P. Karsavin et le
Mouvement Eurasien,” Revue des Etudes Slaves, 1996 68 (3), pp. 357–365.
Dimitrova, Petia, “Russkaia kul’turna cherez vzgliad Evraziitsev,”
Bulgarian Historical Review, 1997 25 (2–3), pp. 205–223. Málishev, Mijail
and Manola, Sepúlveda Garza, “Euroasiatismo: Reveses de la Fortuna de
una Teoria Enterrada y Rescucitada”, Estudios de Asia y Africa, 1997, 32 (3),
pp. 559–573. Shlapentokh, Dmitry V., “Eurasianism: Past and Present,”
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 1997 30 (2), pp. 129–151.
Gogokhiia, E. A. “Evraziiskaia mysl’ ob istokakh Russkoi revoliutsii,”
Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta, Seriia 8, Istoriia: 1998, (5), pp. 54–66.
Dimitrova, Petia, “Georgi Florovski i Evraziiskata sublazun,” Istoricheski
Pregled: 1998, 54 (3–4), pp. 61–76. Vorácek, Emil, “Vznik Eurasijstvi: úvod
do problematiky,” Slovanské Historické Studie: 1997, 23, pp. 35–51.
Vorácek, E. “Vývoj ‘vrcholného’ Eurasijstvi a jeho dobová reﬂexe” Slo-
vanské Historické Studie, 1999, 25, pp. 151–188. Paradowski, Ryszard,
Wysocka, Liliana, and Morren, Douglas, translators, “The Eurasian Idea
and Leo Gumlev’s Scientiﬁc Ideology,” Canadian Slavonic Papers, 1999 41
(1), pp. 19–32.
26 Slawomir, Mazurek, Torr, Guy R., translators, “Russian Eurasianism:
Historiography and Ideology,” Studies in East European Thought, 2002, 54
(1–2), pp. 105–123. Shnirel’man, Viktor Aleksandrovich, “Russkie, ner-
usskie i Evraziiskii federalism: Evraziitsy i ikh opponenty v 1920-E Gody,”
Slavianovedenie: 2002 (4), pp. 3–20. Bocharova, Zola Sergeevna,
“Contemporary Historiography on the Russian émigré community in the
1920s and the 1930s,” Russian Studies in History, 2002, 41 (1), pp. 66–91.
Onegina, Svetlana Viktorovna, “Postrevoluionary Political Movements in
the Russian Expatriate Community in the 1920s and the 1930s (Toward a
History of Ideology),” Russian Studies in History, 2002 41 (1), pp. 38–65.
Vorácek, E., “Vzestupy a pady Eurasijstvi,” Slovanský Prehld, 2001 87 (4),
pp. 451–482. Laruelle, Marlène, “Les Ideologies de la ‘Troisime voie’ dans
les Annees 1920: le Mouvement Eurasiste Russe,” Vingtième Siècle, 2001,
(70), pp. 31–46. Shnirelman, Viktor, “The Fate of Empires and Eurasian
Federalism; a Discussion Between the Eurasianists and Their Opponents
in the 1920s,” Inner Asia: Great Britain 2001, 3 (2), pp. 153–173. Laruelle,
M. “Le Neo-Eurasisme Russe: l’Empire Apres l’Empire?,” Cahiers du Monde
Russ, 2001 42 (1), pp. 71–94. Shnirelman, V.; Pananin, Sergei; Humphrey,
Caroline, translators, “Lev Gumilev: His Pretensions as Founder of
Ethnology and His Eurasian Theories,” Inner Asia: Britain 2001 3 (1), pp. 1–
18. Von Hagen, Mark, “From Russia to Soviet Union to Eurasia: a View
from New York Ten Years After the End of the Soviet Union,” Österrei-
chische Osthefte 2002, 44 (1–2), pp, 43–60. Sergeeva, Ol’ga Alekseevna,
“Tsivilizatsionnaia kontseptsiia, ‘Evraziitsev’ i kritika imi Sovetskoi modeli
ustroeniia obschchestva,” Vostok: 2001 (6), pp. 56–74. Smith, Alexandra,
“Between Art and Politics: Tsvetaeva’s Story, ‘The Chinaman’ and Its Link
with the Eurasian Movement in the 1920s–30s”, Soviet and Post-Soviet
Review, 2001 28 (3), pp. 269–285. Bekker, Roman, “Mezhdu revo-
liutsionnym konservatizmom i totalitarizmom”. Dilemmy otsenki mezh-
voennogo Evraziistva, Slavianovedenie, 2001 (5), pp. 14–27. Rusnak,
Svetlana H.B., “N. V. Ustrialov i Evraziitsy,” Revue des Etudes Slaves, 2001Eurasianism emerged in the early 1920s when a small
group of Russian émigrés, mostly quite young, published
their manifesto Turn to the East. The brochure attracted
immediate attention, and the inﬂuence of Eurasianism
grew. Originally Eurasianism was popular among the ex-
ofﬁcers of the defeated Whitesdwhose minds started to
be framed in Eurasianist directions already during the Civil
Wardwho joined the movement. Later its inﬂuence spread
among broader segments of the émigré community and
reached its peak by the late 1920s.
Eurasianists, similar to other National Bolsheviks,
assumed that despite all its horrors, the Bolshevik Revo-
lution was a positive phenomenon, or at least one with
quite a few positive aspects. The major Bolshevik
achievement was that they had not just restored the
Russian state but revealed its “Eurasian” nature, cleansing
it from the late perversions of the Imperial period, from
Peter the Great to the February/March Revolution. The
point of this Eurasian nature of Russia was that Russia was
a state of all ethnic groups of the Russian empire,
including non-Slavic groups. The Eurasianists actually
elaborated on the speciﬁcity of the Soviet state. On the one
hand, it could be seen as a sort of replica of the pre-
revolutionary Russian empire. On the other hand, it was
not merely the same state but in many ways different, and
the prominent role of the minorities was one of its
essential aspects. And the Eurasianists’ assumption that
Soviet Nationalism was not just a carbon copy of Russian
nationalism of the past but a phenomenon mostly due to
the role of minorities was not groundless.
The Eurasianists’ view of the Soviet regime as a
“Eurasian” state was placed in the context of their idio-
syncratic vision of Russian history, the origin of the
Russian state and the Mongol Empire. Regardless of phil-
osophical views, all Russian historians regarded the
Mongol invasions and yoke as one of the most tragic/
destructive periods in Russian history. For Eurasianists
Mongols were a positive force. They had uniﬁed Eurasia
and laid the foundation of a state where all ethnic groups
not just lived in peace but actually inﬂuenced each other.
More so, the Mongols forged the quasi-cultural, even
quasi-ethnic unitydthe Eurasian nation. This nation
became the framework of the Russian state, the successor
of the Mongol Empire. And the Moscovite state, more than
other political/social organizations, embodied Eurasian
principles.
The reign of Peter the Great had been a watershed in
Russian/Eurasian statehood. Eurasianists were quite crit-
ical of the Petrine reforms. Here they, of course, were73 (2–3), pp. 317–335. Laruelle, M., “Histoire d’une usurpation intellec-
tuelle: L. N. Gumilev, ‘Le dernier des Eurasistes’? Analyse des oppositions
entre L. N. Gumilev et P.N. Savickij”, Revue des Etudes Slaves, 2001 73 (2–
3), pp. 449–459. Laruelle, M., “Lev Nikolaevic Gumilev (1912–1992):
Biologisme et Eurasisme dans la Pensee Russe,” Revue des Etudes Slaves,
France: 2000, 72 (1–2), pp. 163–189. Mehlich, Julia, “Die philosophisch-
theologische Begründung des Eurasismus bei L. P. Karsavin,” Studies in
East European Thought, 2000 52 (1–2), pp. 73–117. Luks, Leonid, “Der
‘Dritte Weg’ der ‘Neo-Eurasischen’ Zeitschrift Elementy: Zur}uck ins Dritte
Reich?” Studies in East European Thought, Netherlands: 2000 52 (1–2), pp.
49–71. Vinkovetsky, Ilya, “Classical Eurasianism and its Legacy”, Cana-
dian–American Slavic Studies, 2000: 34 (2) pp. 125–139.
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brought a new aspect to the context of Petrine Russia.
Peter had discarded the essential aspects of Eurasianism, a
Moscow kingdom that emphasized equality and mutual
intermingling of the ethnic groups and cultures of the
Russian state.
Instead of internationalism and integrationism, Peter
and the emperors who followed him emphasized Russian
nationalism, which alienated the non-Russian residents of
the empire. The imperial elite had other problems as well.
Instead of seeing the ethnic minorities of the empire,
including non-Slavs, as their brothers, they proclaimed
Pan-Slavism, which emphasized the attachments of Slavs
who lived outside the Russian Empire. This was the wrong
approach, because these Slavs had nothing to do with the
people of Russia/Eurasia. Not blood, not even a common
language, but common culture forged by a common his-
tory/space was most important.
The imperial elite also became saturated by Western
culture and alienated from the masses who still lived ac-
cording to Eurasian tradition. It was this cultural tension
between the Westernized elite and Russian masses that
had led to revolution. As a result, the masses had won and
re-created the culture that was the real essence of Russian/
Eurasia. Here, the Russians ruled not as lords but as part of a
family that included all the other people of Eurasia.
It was not just internationalism and integrationism that
had provided the justiﬁcation of the Soviet regime. The
regime revealed another aspect of Russia/Eurasia, the spe-
ciﬁc Eurasian ways of ruling the country. Here Eurasianism
elaborated on the ideology starting to form among the
Soviet elite. As stated above, in the beginning of Soviet rule,
the elite declared that they ruled Russia in the most dem-
ocratic way, and they preached the same until the very end.
Still, as time progressed, they started to develop an ideol-
ogy that reconciled their alleged attachment to democracy
and despotic rule. They asserted that, of course, they had
acted in the interest of the masses and listened to their
voices, and so could be seen as representatives of the
masses, democratic in their very nature. But this attach-
ment to true democracy did not mean the masses should
directly engage in running the state. This approach became
a sort of “functional” ideology of the regime, and the Eur-
asianists elaborated on it. They pointed out that Russia/
Eurasia should be ruled according to “demotia,” and elab-
orated on how this principle should be different from that
of capitalist Western democracies.
Eurasianists pointed out that Western democracy was
not actually the rule of the people because the populace
was brainwashed by the elite, and the elite simply fol-
lowed the interests of the proprietors. This also implied
that the populace could not understand its own goal. The
true interests of the populace could be understood only
by the appropriate elite, who were “idiocratic.” This
“idiocracy” implied that the elite should be above the
personal interests of its members or the masses,27 On the image of Peter in Russian historiography, see: Szvák, Gyula,
“Vitak i Péter reformjairöl az Orosz Törtentirösban,” Világtörténet, 1999
(Fall–Winter), pp. 3–27.narrowly understood and try to materialize the sublime
ideology. And it was this ideology and practice, Eura-
sianists implied, that addressed the basic needs of the
people.
Eurasianists actually had few issues with the Soviet
regime. The only problem was that instead of Orthodoxy,
which was to be the spiritual backbone of Russia/Eurasia,
the Bolsheviks preached Marxism, the foreign Western
teaching. And it was not accidental that the enemies of
Eurasianists regarded them as Bolsheviks with Orthodoxy
instead of Marxism as ideology.
10. Bolshevism as the transformation of the human
species
Both brands of National Bolshevism believed that the
Bolshevik Revolution had strengthened the Russian state.
They believed this stronger state would increase Russia’s
inﬂuence, possibly making Russia a leading nation. And this
was deﬁnitely the belief of those Russian intellectuals who
envisaged much more ambitious plans for the regime than
those that could be imagined by themost ambitious Russian
Nationalists of the past. This group saw the Soviet regime as
a breakthrough in the history of humanity that would lead
to transformation of the human species. They preached
what was usually called “Russian Cosmism.” “Cosmism”
usually implied placing the development of humanity in the
broad context of the development of life and evolution of
the entire cosmos.28 Russian Cosmists often saw humanity
as a geological/cosmic force. This idea emerged in West
European, mostly French thought and was later elaborated
on by Russian thinker Nikolai Fedorov (1828–1903), who
believed that humanity could not only master the blind
forces of nature but even rule over the cosmos.
Some Russian intellectuals, both those who emigrated
and those who lived in the USSR, thought the Soviet system
with a centralized economy and worship of technological
process had created the model for all humanity. They
believed that Sovietized humanity would be able to trans-
form itself and become the true master of the cosmos.
Some of these intellectuals, such as N. A. Setnistkii, a fol-
lower of Fedorov, even thought the Soviet Union could
open an era of the resurrection of the dead. Similar ideas
were elaborated on by Vladimir Vernadsky (1863–1945),
who believed that humanity was a geological, and to some
degree a cosmic force.
11. Conclusion
The ﬁrst and most apparent conclusion from our study
is that there is no uniﬁed image of the regime; those who
lived inside and outside Soviet Russia changed their views
over time. Second, there is a certain uniformity in the
development of both Soviet and émigré thought. The
émigré intellectuals, despite their physical locations28 On Russian cosmism, see Helleman, Wendy E., ed., The Russian Idea: in
Search of a New Identity, Bloomington: Slavica Publishers, 2004; and
Hagemeister, Michael, “Technology as Esoteric Cosmology in Early Soviet
Literature,” The Occult in Russian and Soviet Culture, editor, Rosenthal, B.
G., Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997.
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inside Russia. Moreover, the émigrés could spell out and
work out what otherwise was just kitchen talk for trusted
friends inside Russia.
Third, the study reveals what could be called the illusion
of inevitability. The enemies of socialist doctrine had long
believed that the socialist regime was a sheer Utopian idea
and did not even count on the possibility that the Bolshe-
viks were close to taking power. When they did so, they
believed that the Bolsheviks, a historical aberration, would
collapse in the near future. On solidiﬁcation of their power,
however, the Bolsheviks believed that history worked for
them and their power would spread globallydindeed, it
would be eternal.
The fourth, possibly most important conclusion of the
study, is the “endless,” indeﬁnite meaning of the revolution
as a historical phenomenon. It implies that each historical
phenomenon is not a single, well-deﬁned, ﬁxed fact but
endless numbers of facts that reveal themselves in the
course of the development of the historical process.
In order to understand this notion, look again brieﬂy
look at the changes of the images of revolution. In 1917–
1918, revolution was seen as the beginning of the era of
global transformation. It was either a pathway to liberation
of the toilersdactually of all humanitydand this was the
view of the Leftdor a great catastrophe for the revolution’s
enemies. In the 1920s, Eurasianists, who, in many ways,
spoke for the Russian elite inside the USSR, believed the
Bolshevik Revolution had laid the foundation of a new
unity, the “Eurasian”-Soviet people. And this was the
essential meaning of the Bolshevik Revolution.
For the ideologists of the 1930s–1940s, inside and
outsideRussia, themeaningof theBolshevikRevolution is in
the creation of a global empire. Finally, in the earlier periods
of the Soviet regime, some intellectuals assumed that the
meaning of the revolution was in opening the era of
conquering of the cosmos and transformation of humanity
as a species. This was especially true of those who observed
the Soviet program of exploration of the cosmos during
Khrushchev’s time.
Whether all or any of these visions of the revolution are
wrong and the history of these images is just a move from
one illusion to another, the answer is likely “No.” Those
who saw different meanings in the revolution saw in it real
faculties, real facets of its being. And the historical process
has plainly uncoveredmany, actually inﬁnite, aspects of the
revolution, and induced formulation of the revolution as a
historical phenomenon from a different angle. Thus, the
different interpretations of the revolution, in fact, of any
historical phenomenon, do not just place it in a different
context but actually reveal the multiplicity of the real
ontological being. And this would be so until the end of
interest in this historical phenomenon in intellectual
discourse. Only when interest in the phenomenon dis-
appeared, it underwent what could be called an “absolute
death,” its complete irrelevance to the historical process.
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